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Abstract. The rapid expansion of the quantum interaction (QI) community’s research on cognitive
processes, games, and models of social measurement is affecting every field in the social sciences, and
political science is no exception. This paper aims to expand the substantive terrain of QI’s reach in
the discipline by illuminating a body of political theory that to date has been elaborated in strictly
classical language and formalisms but has complex features that seem to merit generalizations of the
problem outside the confines of classicality. The line of research, initiated by Fiorina in the 1980s,
is of special interest to scholars seeking to understand the origins and nature of party governance in
two-party political systems wherein voters cast partisan ballots in two contests, one that determines
partisan control of the executive branch and another that determines party control of a legislature.
We describe how research in this area evolved in the last two decades in directions that bring it now
to the point where further elaboration and study seem natural in the more general formalistic and
philosophical environments embraced in QI research. In the process, we find evidence using data from
a 1990s-era study that a restriction of a classical model that has animated work in the field appears
violated in a form that gives way naturally to embrace of the superposition principle. We then try
to connect classical distinctions between separable and nonseparable preferences that are common in
political science to their quantum and quantum-like counterparts in the QI literature, finding special
affinity for a recently-introduced understanding of the distinction that provides a passageway into the
boundary between fully quantum and fully classical views of the distinction and thereby provides new
leverage on existing work and data germane to the theory . We conclude with a brief outline of a
primary data collection effort presently underway that is animated by the measurement and modeling
insights developed in this paper.
1 Introduction
Among all of the academic specialties customarily identified as social sciences, political science is per-
haps the greatest “debtor” discipline, in the sense that so many of the theories and methods and models
put to the task of understanding politics are borrowed from scholars working in other fields. It is thus pre-
dictable that some of the latest and most promising theoretical and methodological innovations providing
insight into the operation of politics are not native to political science. What is surprising is their footing
in quantum mechanics. Long thought in the main to be a theory with applications exclusive to the realm of
the near-unobservably small, where probabilities rather than observable mechanics propagate in accordance
with causal laws, the 21st century is becoming witness to an ever-growing export market for the quantum
formalisms and the probability theory native to them.
This paper follows that trend by illuminating a body of political theory that to date has been elaborated
in strictly classical language and formalisms but has complex features that seem to merit generalizations of
the problem outside the confines of classicality. The line of research, initiated by Fiorina in the late 1980s, is
of special interest to scholars seeking to understand the origins and nature of party governance in two-party
political systems wherein voters cast partisan ballots in two contests, one that determines partisan control of
the executive branch and another that determines party control of a legislature. We describe how research in
this area evolved in the 1990s and 2000s in directions that brings it now to the point where further elaboration
and study seem natural in the more general formalistic and philosophical environments embraced in QI
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research. In the process, we find evidence using data from a 1990s-era study that a restriction of a classical
model that has animated work in the field appears violated in a form that gives way naturally to embrace of
the superposition principle. We then try to connect classical distinctions between separable and nonseparable
preferences that are common in political science to their quantum and quantum-like counterparts in the QI
literature, finding special affinity for a recently-introduced understanding of the distinction that provides a
passageway into the boundary between fully quantum and fully classical views of the distinction and thereby
provides new leverage on existing work and data germane to the theory . We conclude with a brief outline
of a primary data collection effort presently underway that is animated by the measurement and modeling
insights developed in this paper.
2 Balancing Theory
Here we address a body of theory that is of special interest to scholars seeking to understand the origins
of party governance in political systems where voters cast partisan ballots in two contests, one involving the
executive branch and one involving the legislature. In the U.S., one of the most prominent strands of research
in this area was initiated by Fiorina in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Fiorina 1996). In contrast to
classical, Downsian (1957) models, where voters with policy preferences that are more moderate than the
positions staked out by parties in two-party systems choose (if possible) the closest of the two alternatives,
Fiorina’s thesis emphasizes the importance of the two institutional choices in U.S. politics – the congress
and the presidency. In his model, voter desires for moderation can be realized by splitting the ticket – voting
Republican in one institutional choice setting and Democratic in the other. Likewise, voters with more
extreme positions can maximize their returns by choosing one party across both institutional contests. This
strand of research thus contrasts with the binary choice (Democrat (D) versus Republican (R)) tradition
from Downs by framing the problem as a choice set for party governance (G) across four mutually exclusive
options, G = [DEDL, DERL, REDL, RERL], where the subscripts distinguish the election contesting control
of the executive branch from the one deciding control of the legislature.
Fiorina’s initial formulation of the problem defined the choice options as well as voter positions relative to
them in a one-dimensional, policy-specific, liberal-versus-conservative Euclidean space.3 Across indivduals,
different issues have different (or no) salience. Moreover, individual understandings/predictions of where the
parties stand on issues may be variable. For one or all of these reasons, measured policy preferences in the
mass public are not stable across time, an empirical regularity traceable back at least to Converse (1964).
Another complication is that, a priori, the universe of salient policies in an election is difficult to determine,
and thus measure, for all voters/respondents/subjects. Given all these givens, it is perhaps not surprising
that many of the scholars who have investigated the empirical relevance of Fiorina’s “policy balancing”
theory report that it provides little or no observable, explanatory purchase to our understanding of partisan
or bipartisan (i.e. ticket-splitting) choice (cf. Petrocik and Doherty (1996), Carsey and Layman 2004).
However, “party balancing” is a different matter. As explained by Smith et al. (1999), “the act of ‘policy
balancing’ implies that individual voters ultimately engage in ‘party balancing’” (p. 742), a process whereby
voters adjust their preferences regarding which party should control one institution based on either prefer-
ences for or expected outcomes about partisan control of the other. The focus of this study was narrow: the
authors took as their primary task an analysis of how then-customary, statistical models of candidate/party
choice in U.S. congressional elections might be better specified given an account of measurement metric
implications derivative of one (of several) possible, theoretical exposition(s) of party balancing. However,
both the theory underlying the hypotheses tested in the research and the data used to do so are perhaps
of broader interest. On the theoretical side, this study leans on one account of how social scientists under-
stand the distinction between preference separability and nonseparability, issues that merit attention given
their kinship (and lack thereof) with the quantum mechanical meanings of those terms. On the empirical
side, results in the survey data used in the Smith et al. study are not readily accommodated by classical
formalizations. In the subsections that follow, we elaborate.
3 A generalization of that model to N dimensions is straightforward, but specifications of its empirical implications
relative to the four partisan choice options are not easily defined in a parsimonious fashion.
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2.1 Classical Views of Separability and Nonseparability
Social scientists understand and use the words separable and nonseparable in ways that are distinct from
the quantum mechanical meanings of the terms. The most general tradition uses the terms to distinguish
between two types of preference orders. The most basic, classical example is one voter with two considerations,
observable as two bits. Preferences are said to be separable when each of those preferences arises independent
of the consideration of or outcome on the other. Of the twenty-four (4!) possible preference orderings in the
two-bit example, the eight orderings with last preferences as mirror images of the first (e.g. 00 ... 11) are
understood to be separable orderings when the considerations are of equal salience and the orderings are
observed across groups of voters as invariant to the order in which the preferences are measured (Lacy and
Niou 1998).
Fig. 1. Divided vs. Unified Control of Govern-
ment
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A visually intuitive and simple alternative to under-
standing separability and nonseparability in previous so-
cial science work (including that on balancing theory) is
animated by a simple model and illustration. For Fig-
ure 1, define S as an initial state belief vector that can
be used to describe considerations over preferences re-
garding partisan control (Republican versus Democratic)
of both the executive and the legislative branches in an
election. Belief vectors regarding partisan options in the
two-dimensional space can then be described in terms
of coordinates specific to each branch. Further, define a
simple Euclidean distance in the space:
||SE − SL||I =
√
(RE −DE)2 + (RL −DL)2 (1)
where I is 2× 2 with elements that can be interpreted as
weights. Specifically, the main diagonal weights signify
the salience of the two, associated dimensions of party
governance, their ratio the relative importance of them.
In order for the space to remain Euclidean, the off diago-
nal elements must be equal. When as here they are jointly
equal to zero, “there is no interaction between” (Enelow
and Hinich 1984, 19) the considerations, and the prefer-
ences arising from them are said classically to be separable.
Now consider an alternative transition matrix:
A =
[
α11 α12
α21 α22
]
(2)
with the restriction α12 = α21 = α. Replacing I with A gives:
||SE − SL||A =
√
α11(RE −DE)2 + 2α(RE −DE)(RL −DL) + α22(RL −DL)2 (3)
This is a stylized version of the weighted Euclidean norm developed by Enelow and Hinich (1984).4 Fixing
coordinates at the poles of one dimension and differentiating the square to invoke preferences in the other
4 Hinich and Munger (1997) generalize the norm to N dimensions. Spatial voting theory more generally is built
upon the early work of Davis and Hinich (e.g., 1968); Gorman (1968) is a fundamental work on the concept of
separability, an idea he credits without specific citation to Leontief. Schwartz (1977) was first to consider the
problem in multiple elections. Lacy (2001a,b; Lacy and Niou 1998) offers more recent examples of applied and
theoretical work on the separability-nonseparability distinction in political decision theory.
3
when A is a matrix of positive ones gives REDL and DERL. These are the choice options of the balancer – the
voter who prefers a form of coalition government to one-party control. Conversely, preferences in the unifying
regime – RERL and DEDL – are given by fixing the off-diagonal elements of A at -1. Classically, these
conditions imply that preferences are fully nonseparable and assume that the relevance to party governance
of the executive and legislature are equal. The probabilities of the four outcomes for partisan control of
government thus sum to unity when given ±α and a partisan outcome in one dimension. That is, for a 4× 1
state vector (ψ),
ψ =

ψDD
ψDR
ψRD
ψRR
 −→ ψ−α = 12

1
0
0
1
 , (4)
the vector transitions for voters with −α to the unifying regime and Pr(DD | D) = Pr(RR | R) = .5.
Likewise, ψ transitions to the balancing regime and Pr(RD | D) = Pr(DR | R) = .5 with positive α, as in:
ψ =

ψDD
ψDR
ψRD
ψRR
 −→ ψα = 12

0
1
1
0
 . (5)
Most modeling and analysis in the social sciences proceed implicitly from the assumption that the ob-
servables involved in the models arise from separable considerations even when there are sound theoretical
reasons to expect otherwise: economists aggregate goods in bundles that might not be separable in the
minds of consumers, while political scientists do the same thing with issue preferences and voters. At best,
these practices foreclose nuanced observation of potentially interesting phenomena; in the worst scenarios,
they may lead to faulty inferences. As a result, it is easy to embrace theoretical and empirical work in the
social sciences that make and/or test explicit assumptions about the distinction between separability and
nonseparability. We are however given pause with respect to certain aspects of modeling and nomenclature
conventions used routinely in social science in the course of defining and understanding the distinction. In
the subsection that follows, we show evidence using the Smith et. al data that a tenet of a classical model
that has animated work in the field appears violated in a form that gives way naturally to embrace of the
superposition principle and then suggest that the classical formalisms and theories of preference separability
might best be viewed as special cases of the quantum versions even when the real-world problems being
studied are decidedly macroscopic and traditionally seen in the social sciences only through the lens of
classicality.
2.2 Toward a More General Framework
Spatial representations of voting have been criticized for being overly restrictive, not least with respect
to defining separable and nonseparable preferences. Lacy (2001), for example, notes that in N dimensions,
the model set out by Hinich and Munger (1997) does not account for the possibility that sets of preferences
might be nonseparable from one or more other sets. He also implies that the symmetry of the transition
matrix Arequires, given nonseparability, that each preference depend equally on the outcome relative to the
other consideration. We have come to see these sorts of criticisms as wide of the mark. The first critique can
be addressed simply by further generalizing the Hinich-Munger model. The second is only true if, as in our
example above, it is assumed to be so; the weighted Euclidean norm certainly does not require, to reference
our example, that the legislative preference be conditioned by the executive outcome when the reverse is
true (formally: one of the main diagonal weights in A can be zero while the other is nonzero). Indeed, where
others see differences in generality across the spatial and preference-order representations of separability and
nonseparability in social science work, we, excepting presentation differences, see commonality. One tradition,
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the spatial theory, lays bare via a toy model the mechanics of the distinction; the other eschews a continuous,
interval level metric; in two dimensions such as the problem above, they both distinguish in question order
experiments or conditioning questions the same preference orders as exhibits of separability, the same orders
as exhibiting nonseparability. Thus, at least relative to the balancing problem in two dimensions, the social
science traditions are equivalent.
Table 1. Conditional and Unconditional Preferences
for Congressional Control, 1996
Unconditional Democratic Executive
Preference Dem. Either GOP Total
Democrat 188 16 98 302
Either/DK 77 26 151 254
GOP 33 9 339 381
Total 298 51 588 937
χ24 = 256 (P < 0.001); γˆ = 0.72.
Unconditional GOP Executive
Preference Dem. Either GOP Total
Democrat 258 10 34 302
Either/DK 151 31 74 256
GOP 99 14 266 379
Total 508 55 374 937
χ24 = 290 (P < 0.001); γˆ = 0.73.
What the traditions in social science have most in
common is their firm and exclusive footings in classi-
cality. This is most readily illustrated in the context of
the balancing problem with a simple hypothetical. As-
sume survey respondents are asked two conditioning
questions about their preferences regarding partisan
control of each of the two institutions, and further
that all respondents choose R across all four condi-
tions. These observables would reveal one preference
order for all subjects, with RR most preferred and
DD least. As such, they would satisfy the inverse rule
(Lacy 2001a,b), which in two dimensions is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition to establish separability
via the preference order tradition of understanding
these terms. From the standpoint of the spatial theory
of voting, the off-diagonal of A would be presumed re-
vealed as zero, and likewise, the preferences called sep-
arable. More fundamental, though, is that classically-
trained social scientists would assume that something
else is revealed in these observations, namely the prob-
abilities that the respondents would have preferred R
for each of the institutions in the absence of the con-
ditioning questions. Axiomatically, the probability of
R absent the conditions is a weighted average of the
conditional probabilities gauged across the mutually
exclusive and exhaustive options of the conditions. In
our hypothetical, the unconditional probability of R
as a revealed preference must then be unity in both
dimensions.
A close reexamination of the data used by Smith and his colleagues in their 1990s study of the balancing
problem gives pause against full embrace of such an axiom.5 Following their Table 2 (p. 748), we report results
in a contingency table from two conditional questions about partisan control of the U.S. Congress, one fixing
a Republican victory in the presidential election and one fixing a Democratic win; both are compared to
a variable measuring each respondent’s “unconditional” preference over partisan control of Congress (that
is, without conditioning on executive control). Results on the main diagonal of the tables thus denote
respondents who answered consistently across the two conditions, and are described as characterizing voters
with separable preferences. This is true by any classical standard, but we wondered about the purchase of
the likewise classical assumption about preferences absent the conditions. The study includes and features
two indicators proposed as such, one fashioned by the authors and called a “direct” measure, and another,
“indirect” indicator that is among the most familiar measures in U.S. political science, the party identification
measure developed by the authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) and used continuously
since in the biannual U.S. National Election Studies. We look now at both unconditional preference measures
5 The data for the Smith et al. study came “from a pre-election telephone survey conducted by the Social Science
Research Laboratory at the University of Mississippi between October 11 and November 3, 1996. The sample
covered the lower forty-eight [U.S.] states and the District of Columbia. The data set contains 995 completed
observations.” (Smith et al. 1999, p. 739)
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within the subset of respondents classified as having separable preferences based on their consistent partisan
choices across the conditions and find provocative results.
Judged against the unconditional legislative preference measure developed by the authors, almost 16%
of all survey respondents in the study are classified as having separable preferences using the conditional
measures but offer a different preference absent the conditions. As a percentage of those classified as having
separable preferences, respondents with different unconditional preferences count north of 20%. A large
measure of the effect is owed to the authors’ inclusion of middle categories in the preference measures, and
to the respondents’ choosing DD or RR given the conditioning but a neutral position in the absence of it.
However, there is a nontrivial amount of outright party switching (conditional to unconditional) in these data:
8.8% of those conditioned to DD chose R absent the conditioning; 4.7% conditioned to RR choose D. Using
party identification as the unconditional measure, nearly thirty percent of voters classified as having separable
preferences give a response different from the consistent ones they give on the conditional indicators. As with
the other measurement standard, the partisanship version of unconditional party preference shows that the
prevalent quirk in the data is the tendency for DD voters to chose a more Republican option without the
conditioning. Indeed, the proportions of DD voters who seem more Republican in the unconditional measures
are statistically distinct from the proportions of RR voters who seem unconditionally more Democratic
(P = .011 using the “direct” measure of unconditional preference, P = .016 using party identification). If
this is measurement error, it does not appear to be random, as we would expect these proportions to be
indistinguishable from each other given the symmetry of the problem’s context.
Obviously, these results do not comport well with the classical understandings of separability. Classical
rationales for the misfit data are certainly possible; measurement error, for example, need not be random.
However, if we ponder such extra-contextual explanations while maintaining the classical theoretical moti-
vation for the problem, it is important to recognize that potentially important substantive insights inside
the context of the problem are foreclosed. One we have in mind is rooted deeply in the normative concerns
presumed to motivate voters to on the one hand divide or on the other unify partisan control of the branches.
Another relates to the nature of partisanship itself, originally and still-usually construed as an affective ori-
entation toward a group. With respect to the distinction between favoring one-party versus divided control,
the fact is that there are plausible reasons to favor both, plausible reasons even to feel disfavor toward both.
In the U.S. system, one-party control is described pejoratively by some as undermining the system of checks
and balances designed to limit the power of government, or at least the speed with which it affects sweeping
change. One-party control is described elsewhere as necessary to avoid gridlock, and better still because in its
absence voters have difficulty behaving responsibly in rewarding positive performance and punishing failure.
Divided control can likewise sensibly be described as good or bad, or both at the same time. And so it is
as well with the parties. Positive affect toward one party need not be accompanied by an equal amount of
antipathy toward the other. Judged anecdotally from public discourse, antipathy toward both parties in the
U.S. is widespread, though of course we can also imagine voters with positive affect toward both of them at
the same time.
The clear message is that this problem is as simple as elementary geometry when applied to the institu-
tions and the parties, but potentially very complex in the minds of voters. At a given time, partisan control
of the U.S. government (and like systems) will in fact either be divided across the parties or unified by the
leadership of just one. Likewise, a given branch of the U.S. government (and other two-party systems) will
at a given time be controlled either by one party or the other. These realities yield exhaustive and mutually
exclusive conditions, and classical models that superimpose the conditions that follow from these externali-
ties upon voters have an attraction – a verisimilitude judged against political arrangements fixed in specific
ways. But, as we have seen, they are limited. Indeed, in the context of the balancing problem, it is awkward
to write down preference orders and, a priori, single some out as evidence of separable preferences and others
as markers of nonseparability if the cognitive processes at work in the minds of voters as they reveal their
preferences might be more nuanced than the rationale for labeling the orders as separable or not. Similarly,
the spatial model provides no quarter, as it will, for example, accommodate an induced voter preference for
RL from DL in one regime, but not in the other – this no matter how deep our suspicions that some voter
might maintain affect or antipathy for both regimes at the same time.
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Fashioning variables from the answers to a pair of agree-disagree items that were part of the survey
instrument used in the Smith et al. study but never reported on provides further insight. Specifically, the
instrument queried respondents about their affect toward unified and divided government in separate items,
one gauging agreement/disagreement with the statement “the government works best when one party con-
trols both the Congress and the presidency,” and another with the opposite stimulus, positing that “the
government works best when control of the congress and the presidency is split between the parties.” Per
restrictions in the theory, we would expect that variables fashioned to order increasing agreement with these
statements would, for a voter with nonseparable preferences, elicit high agreement on one accompanied by
low agreement on the other, and that across voters, these variables would be highly and negatively cor-
related. We find instead that that they are not related in a statistically discernible way, and this is true
both in the main, and within groupings of respondents that exhibit on the one hand alignment in their
partisan preferences for control of the Congress given partisan outcomes for the presidency and on the other
among respondents that chose different parties for control of the legislature across the conditioning executive
options. Across individuals, indeed, affect toward unified control appears quite orthogonal to affect toward
divided control6 – a result far afield from the theory.
Table 2. Influences on Separability of Prefer-
ences
Two-Item Three-Item
Response Response
Constant -0.47 0.53
(0.28) (0.29)
Affinity: Unified -0.32 -0.35
(0.10) (0.11)
Affinity: Divided 0.56 0.54
(0.11) (0.11)
Democrat -0.27 -0.54
(0.17) (0.19)
Republican -1.14 -1.42
(0.18) (0.19)
χ24 91.8 113.4
N 899 847
Still more insight into the fit of the classical assump-
tions to the data is given by fashioning binary variables
from the legislative preference measures that would seem
to distinguish respondents who exhibit preferences con-
sistent with classically separable preferences from those
exhibiting classical nonseparability. We did this two ways.
One – identified as the “two-item response” variable in
Table 2 – is scored zero when both executive condition-
ing questions evoke identical legislative preference re-
ports across the conditions and one otherwise. The second
(“three-item response”) requires in the zero category the
same as the first, plus a third, unconditioned match to
the two identical reports given the conditions. What these
variables do is separate respondents whose legislative
preferences appear invariant to conditioning with hypo-
thetical executive outcomes (and thus presumed separa-
ble from E ) from those who exhibit adjustments (perhaps
nonseparable from E ). As an additional pair of controls,
we also include indicators for respondents’ partisan self-
identification; Democrat and Republican are naturally-
coded indicator variables gleaned from an ANES-like
measure of party identification. Inclusion of these vari-
ables obviates the potential that our results for unified
/ divided government are driven by purely partisan con-
cerns (as would be the case, for example, if Democrats – whose incumbent president held a clear lead over
his Republican challenger for most of the 1996 election season – were more solicitous of divided government
than were Republicans).
We find in Table 2 that both affinity for Divided government and affinity for Unified control – variables
uncorrelated with each other – contribute in statistically relevant ways to these distinctions, with proponents
of unified control having a greater likelihood of also exhibiting separable preferences; in contrast, those with
greater affect toward divided control of government were more likely to reveal legislative preferences that
seem conditioned by (and thus nonseparable from) outcomes on E. These results, as with the apparently
orthogonality of the affinity measures, are not animated by the classical theory. Likewise, turning again to
Table 2, we find puzzling results with partisanship amidst the covariates. The main result is that self-identified
Republicans seem especially invariant to the conditioning items. Here again, we see no accommodation for
6 The Pearson’s correlation between the two variables is -0.05 (γˆ = −0.07).
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such an effect in the formal theory that animates the Smith et al. study (or any other study), and thus
conclude that the balancing problem is ripe for generalization.
3 Testing a Pseudo-Classical Model of Voter Preference
Our task, then, is to develop a model of partisan balancing that can reconcile existing theoretical accounts
with empirical reality. In doing so, however, we do not wish to fully foreclose on the simple model of §2.1
and its implications, first because it is clear from the data we and others have examined that this model
ably characterizes the preferences of many voters, and that its distinctions between unifying and dividing
have important empirical implications for statistical models of voter choice. Second, because an on-going
interest in our research program is to better understand and articulate translations of models that have
to-date been viewed in political science from strictly classical perspectives, we wish here to keep the one in
§2.1 prominent in the background for the purpose of illuminating, if here in only a preliminary way, what
kinships we can divine between the classical treatment of the problem and prominent advances in the QI
literature. We begin by noting that there is no dispute in the U.S.-based political science literature over the
dimensionality of the balancing problem, or others like it; indeed, in every paper we have seen that broaches
the topic of separable versus nonseparable preferences, a simple example of what can be called the two-bit
case is referenced in the course of explaining the distinction. However, as Smith et. al note, the weighted
Euclidean has implications for the metrics of the space. The authors trace one implication into an analysis
of the fit of statistical models, but as with others writing before and after them, they otherwise treat the
weighted Euclidean as a tool to classify voters against hypothetical arrangements of parties and institutions
– these voters evidencing separable preferences, these showing nonseparable preferences of a particular form,
and so on. They do not, and indeed no classical scientist has, considered it as a cognitive process model,
descriptive of the thinking of an individual voter.
When we do so, we see an important change in the dimensionality of the space when the elements of
A are nonzero. Indeed, when as in §2.1 A is a matrix of ones, we see the problem applied to the voter as
producing four and not two bits. This is because there are at the same time for every voter two partisan
preferences for each dimension of governance, one (say, for the Legislature) “invoked” by a fixed (say, R)
outcome in the other (Executive), and a second one, also for the legislature, “invoked” by the opposite fixed
outcome (D = Executive). So, for every voter, L can be conceptualized as a two-bit registry, and likewise for
E, making the total four. Conceptually, we are now only a step away from a full alignment of the problem
in a more general space, and indeed are outside the bounds of classical approaches already in considering
two partisan preferences for each dimension at the same time for one voter. From a quantum perspective,
such preferences would be described as being in superposition, and in a Hilbert space, the problem we have
elaborated here would be described not in terms of four bits but rather in terms of two qubits. Such a space
would generally have dimension 2k, where k is the number of qubits. Defined over the real numbers, this
space has deep kinships with spatial models in political science, including its depiction of distance, which is
Euclidean. Defined over complex numbers, the problem is made still more general, as we would then have
voters consider executive (e) and legislative (l) dimensions to governance and define partisan options (r and
d) for each, writing the tensor product:
|e〉 ⊗ |l〉 = a0b0 |dd〉+ a1b0 |dr〉+ a0b1 |rd〉+ a1b1 |rr〉 (6)
where the two qubits are in superposition, e and l are independent, and the existence of the full complement
of product weights defines separability.
In §2.1 we wrote of differentiating the square of the weighted Euclidean and finding four partial derivatives
to invoke completely nonseparable preferences, one set shifting voters to the balancing regime and the other
shifting other voters to the unifying regime. The quantum analogy of the four outcomes is:
1√
2
(|dd〉+ |rr〉) 1√
2
(|dd〉 − |rr〉)
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1√
2
(|dr〉+ |rd〉) 1√
2
(|dr〉 − |rd〉)
These are the maximally-entangled, two-qubit states namesaked for John Bell after his fundamental work
(1964) on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox (1935). In the QI literature, this type of nonseparability has
been considered in application to social/cognitive data for more than a decade (e.g., Aerts et al. 2000; Aerts
et al. 2005; Bruza et al. 2009; Bruza et al. 2010; Gabora and Aerts 2009), and is of a radically different
nature than any corollary ever considered in political science. Formally, “there are no coefficients which
can decompose” (Bruza et al. 2009, p. 6) the states into the tensor product above that sets out e and l
as independent. When conceptualized as resident in a Bell state, quantum nonseparable, preferences in one
dimension are not so much conditioned or dependent upon outcomes in another as given by them, so even
to properly consider those in one dimension requires consideration of those in the other.
Likewise, quantum separability differs radically from separability conditions customarily considered in
political science. As fashioned above, the tensor product |e〉⊗|l〉 seems to capture quite precisely the language
used by political scientists when describing separability, as considerations in one dimension are independent
of those in the other at the level of the voter. However, we have come to recognize that separable preferences
as defined in the political science literature would not necessarily be viewed as separable in the quantum
generalization. This can be seen in the tradition of preference order rankings understanding of separability
by noting that one could not, against the quantum definition of separable preferences, write out a subset
of the 4! preference orders in the problem and, a priori, privilege eight or four or even one of them as
demonstrating separability. Likewise, classical reasoning from the spatial model and the weighted Euclidean
about separability runs aground against the mathematics in (6). Indeed, the weighted norm fashioned so
as to depict fully separable preferences they are traditionally understood in political science can be readily
interpreted as mapping directly to one of the Bell states. The traditions, quantum versus classical, thus seem
at once deeply related, and profoundly incompatible.
However, a recent and we think quite important innovation by Bruza, Iqbal, and Kitto (2010) provides a
passage into the boundary between Bell-type entanglement and nonseparability as it has been traditionally
understood in political science. Challenging what perhaps was a status quo in the QI literature – using the
Bell inequalities as “the formal device for determining non-separability” (p. 26) – the authors add to the
nomenclature the notion of “psuedo-classical” nonseparability and situate understanding of this phenomenon
in territory familiar to classically-trained social scientists by formalizing it as a factorization problem in a
joint probability distribution. Probabilistically, if generalizing balancing theory fully quantum, we would
refashion the state vector (ψ) from 2.1 to an uninformed state (ψu):
ψ =

ψDD
ψDR
ψRD
ψRR
 −→ ψu = 12

1
1
1
1
 (7)
where probabilistic reasoning must shift from within the confines of classical, Kolmogovorian theory to that
of the more general theory often namesaked for Born (1926).
The Bruza et al. (2010) innovation in contrast foots the distinction between separable nonseparable in
classical probability theory, retaining the law of total probability that is not a feature of the fully quantum
perspective. Elaborating from a theorem proved by Suppes and Zanotti (1981), Bruza et al. (2010) note that
for two random variables A and B and a conditioning (factorizing) variable λ,
Pr(A,B, λ) = Pr(A|λ) Pr(B|λ) Pr(λ) (8)
and
Pr(A,B) =
∑
j∈Λ
Pr(A|λj) Pr(B|λj) Pr(λj) (9)
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where Λ is the set of values taken on by λ. In this framework we find a new lever into the balancing problem
and the Smith et al. data by considering our executive party priming variable λ, and the respondents’ choices
over partisan Congressional control our central variable of interest Y . In analogous fashion to (9), we can
write
Pr(Y ) =
∑
j∈Λ
Pr(Y |λj) Pr(λj). (10)
By treating the marginals of our unconditional Congressional control measure as an empirical estimate of
the “true” unconditional distribution, we can compare (via a standard chi-square test) the cell frequencies
for the two conditional measures to that for the unconditional item.
Fig. 2. χ2 Values for Conditional vs. Uncondi-
tional Preferences Over Divided Government
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Dotted line indicates value for P=0.0001
Bruza et al. note that, in addition to the law of to-
tal probability, their approach requires attention to the
presumed prior probability distribution of λ, in particu-
lar that the distribution of λ is uniform. While in their
experiments they randomly assigned subjects to prim-
ing conditions, here all respondents answer all three ver-
sions of the Congressional control question (conditional
on Democratic control of the executive, conditional on
Republican control of the executive, and unconditional).
As a result, to ensure the robustness of our findings
we consider the range of possible values for the prior
on λ = Pr(Dem. Executive Control); consistency in the
findings of the test across a broad range of potential prior
values for λ would suggest that our results are not sensi-
tive to the choice of prior.
Figure 2 plots the values of that χ2 statistic over a
range of values λ˜ ∈ [0, 1]; cell frequencies for the statis-
tic were thus calculated as λ˜fDj + (1− λ˜fRj), where fDj
and fRj denote the cell frequencies from the one-way ta-
ble of responses conditional on Democratic and Repub-
lican control of the executive, respectively. For all pos-
sible prior values of λ, we note a substantial statistical
difference between the distributions of preferences over
partisan control of Congress between the conditional and unconditional measures, and at no point over the
range of those values does the test statistic remotely approach statistical insignificance. As Bruza et al.
(2010, 2011) note, if the remaining two assumptions about the prior distribution of λ and the law of total
probability hold, this can be interpreted as evidence in support of nonseparability in preferences.
4 Concluding Comments
In a recent paper, Busemeyer et al. note that “quantum information processing principles provide a
viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning” (2011, 54). Somewhat more
specifically, Bruza and colleagues suggest that their notion of “psuedo-classical” nonseparability “is a useful
one in order to classify quantum-like systems” (Bruza et al. 2010). We are fully aligned with both of these
these sentiments, and indeed have come to suspect that the latter will receive nontrivial acclaim as an
outright alternative to what we have now come to view as very restrictive accounts in political science.
At the same time, we recognize that we cannot advance our work on balancing much further in the
absence of primary data. We believe our reanalysis of the Smith et al. data is informative, but the fact that
their data was not collected specifically for purposes put to task here means it has significant drawbacks.
Far and away the most obvious of these is that, while Smith et al. condition (and do not condition) their
questions about Congressional control on partisan control of the executive branch, they neglect to do the
10
reverse. As a result, we cannot ascertain whether or not the same dynamics apply to executive control, and
moreover, are limited (by precisely half) in our ability to model nonseparability in the full context of the
problem. Second, Smith et al. did not vary the order in which the three Congressional control questions (two
conditional, one unconditional) were asked. As many scholars have noted (e.g., Trueblood and Busemeyer
2011), a key implication of quantum-like macro-level phenomena are order effects; failure to account for
such effects presents a serious risk to inference about such phenomena. Last, some of the relevant measures
in the Smith et al. study are fashioned so as to foreclose a superposition-like multidimensionality; party
identification is but one example.
Fig. 3. Current Divided Government Survey
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Building upon Smith et al.’s survey, we currently
(April 2011) have in the field a pilot instrument designed
to measure attitudes toward unified and divided govern-
ment. In fashioning the protocols for the study, our cen-
tral goal was to overcome the obstacles described above.
To that end, our revised instrument asks a “symmetri-
cal” set of questions about divided and unified control
of the executive and legislative branches of government.
As illustrated in Figure 3, we also randomize question
order in blocks: first by institution (executive or legisla-
tive), second by conditioning, and finally (within condi-
tional blocks) by identity of partisan control. In addition,
we also include the two-way questions regarding affinity
for divided government in general; these questions are
also randomized both vis-a-vis their order relative to the
items in Figure 3 and with respect to each other. Finally –
building on the early, influential work of Weisberg (1980)
– we measure respondents’ party identification through
a series of self-identification questions designed so as not
to foreclose on the prospect that a subject can maintain
an affinity for both parties at the same time. In each instance, these changes to existing (and “industry-
standard”) protocols will enable us to begin to evaluate quantum-consistent theories of voter attitudes on
an equal footing with their classical counterparts.
Beyond overcoming the limitations of existing studies, our broader goals in this endeavor are to create
a set of instruments by which we and other researchers can begin to evaluate macro-level quantum and
“pseudo-classical” processes in sociopolitical data. In a field (politics) in which the amount and quality of
information varies widely, ambivalence of attitudes are widespread, and citizens often exhibit patterns of
behavior that fail to correspond to classical models of human action, the intuitions of quantum cognition
and action hold particular promise.
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